INTRODUCTION

In 2006, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld launched the process of creating a US
Africa Command (AFRICOM) to take over the areas of responsibility in Africa from US European Command (EUCOM), US Central Command (CENTCOM), and US Pacific Command (PACOM). 1 Towards the end of 2006, as he was leaving office, Secretary Rumsfeld charged an implementation planning team with putting the process in motion; directed that AFRICOM reach full operational capability on October 1, 2008 ; and ordered that a headquarters be established by
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and policies of the U.S. Air War College, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other branch of the US Government. The paper is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. This report will demonstrate that U.S. change agents in seeking transformation focused inwardly within the bureaucracy. They did not bother to consult with African leaders and made assumptions about African reactions to AFRICOM which demonstrated a lack of empathy. The authoritarian leadership style of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld brought about an -order that could not be refused,‖ including the unfortunate directive that AFRICOM headquarters should be placed on the African continent. The directive was rejected by most African leaders and media.
A subsequent -s trategic communications‖ campaign to repackage AFRICOM and sell it to African leaders failed because of already established suspicions. Only the reversal of the directive to place the command on the continent brought grudging acceptance, along with US offers of training exercises and other forms of security assistance. Change agents within a bureaucracy must be careful to consult with foreign actors in attempting to bring about transformation.
While African reaction to AFRICOM was largely negative, there was variation in types of responses. Some leaders in sub-regions and states feared terrorist attacks against an AFRICOM base that would undermine their regimes. Others feared the possibility of regime change. Sub-regional powers objected to US military presence in their areas of hegemonic control. Ideology was important, with non-aligned states rejecting AFRICOM and more liberal and pro-Western states accepting it. A second conclusion is that African states are weak. Those states that do not align themselves with the United States feel threatened by it.
The negative lessons of 2007 demonstrate that Africa Command and US diplomats should continue engaging with regional players in order to explain the purpose of the new command and react to feedback. Thanks to considerable US diplomacy in 2008, African perceptions of US security policy and strategy in Africa and of US Africa Command have shifted from largely negative to mostly positive. that date -on the African continent‖. 2 regions (west, east, north, southern, and central), many leaders and media commentators spoke out against AFRICOM. 3 Resistance culminated in a January 2008 African Union (AU) summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, when AFRICOM was a matter of discussion. However, member states refrained from passing a resolution condemning the new command, which meant that the process of creating AFRICOM could realistically continue without African censure. 4 In the wake of the AU summit, US officials pressed on towards AFRICOM's full operational capability on October 1, 2008. However, in response to strong African resistance to the prospect of an enhanced US military presence on the continent, the directive to place an AFRICOM headquarters somewhere in Africa was shelved. 5 Even more modest proposals for AFRICOM -regional integration teams‖ or -regional offices‖, which would work with subregional organizations, were dropped. 6 It was hoped that these changes would make it easier for AFRICOM to engage with African countries and regional organizations.
With the end of plans to expeditiously place AFRICOM headquarters on the continent, resistance diminished in some African countries, and with offers of training and other forms of assistance, states began to engage AFRICOM. Even so, AFRICOM faces an uphill struggle to succeed as a combatant command. It is probable that Congress will not be wholly convinced about AFRICOM's strategic importance and will not provide adequate funding; and African leaders will be disappointed at the command's inability to provide the level of training and other services that EUCOM and CENTCOM do presently for African countries.
Two fundamental questions for this report are: why did US officials behave the way they did in authorizing and announcing the establishment of AFRICOM? And why did many African leaders strongly resist the creation of AFRICOM?
This report examines strategic challenges in the standup of AFRICOM and changing USAfrica security relations. In addressing the research questions, foreign policy decision-making and implementation cases as well as theories, models and hypotheses are examined and utilized in helping to explain the way in which AFRICOM was formed as well as negative African reactions and helping to predict the future of AFRICOM and US-Africa relations and more specifically how AFRICOM might relate to regional actors in Africa and assesses how it might shape efforts in East, West and Southern Africa. This report draws on interviews with US and African officials and experts. The focus of interviews has been on Southern, East and West Africa; these are the three sub-regions with -a nchor states‖ (i.e., South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia); These and other cases demonstrate the importance of securing legitimation in US foreign and security policy decisions.
As will be explored in this report, it appears that US officials did not feel that legitimation was important in regard to AFRICOM and assumed that African leaders trusted the United States. This assumption was based upon more than a decade of engagement by EUCOM and CENTCOM in Africa. It also indicates a lack of empathy on the part of decision-makers.
From another perspective, Africa has been of relatively low importance to the United States. Therefore, the possibility of negative feedback and even rejection by African leaders did not appear to decision-makers to present significant costs to the United States.
The most prominent case of foreign policy decision-making, which involved nonconsultation with other actors, was the Cuban missile crisis. The Kennedy administration worked in secrecy for more than a week to arrive at a decision before it began engaging with the Soviets.
From his examination of the decision-making process, Graham Allison generated the -g overnmental (bureaucratic) politics‖ model to explain why the decision-making process led to the compromise -e mbargo‖ decision that was made and not to the more -rational‖ or realist decision of attacking Cuba and Soviet forces that was initially favored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others. 8 JFK managed to avoid choosing air strikes against Cuba, which were being urged on him by his military advisors, by seeking to generate alternative courses of actions through convening a team of foreign policy and national security experts in the Executive Committee (EXCOM) of the NSC. The Cuban missile crisis demonstrates that, when the stakes are high and the costs of a bad decision can lead to disaster, leaders often seek other ways of deliberating to reach an alternative decision and course of action. The crisis was bilateral with no great need for multilateral legitimation of the US decision. Obviously, in the AFRICOM case, the stakes were far lower, though decision-makers also felt no need for legitimation and proceeded without consulting African leaders and regional organizations.
After President Kennedy announced the US course of action, he made certain that the Soviet Union was informed in regard to US decisions and the implementation process, because the costs of non-communication could have been nuclear war. In this sense, the US decisionmaking process conformed to the realist -rational actor model‖ in which state actors behave in accordance to their interests. 9 Similarly, once the decision was announced and resistance mounted, US officials also felt the need to reach out to African states and organizations in order to avoid rejection and thereby sustain the AFRICOM project.
In 1971, the Nixon administration did not consult with its allies when it ended the gold standard for the US dollar. After internal deliberations, the administration arrived at a unilateral decision, which the administration announced and implemented. Afterwards, the administration conciliated with angry European partner nations whose currencies had suddenly been devalued.
However, there was no threatened massive retaliation from Europe, and President Nixon timed the announcement to bring political advantage to his administration. 10 In contrast, the AFRICOM case involved lower stakes and apparently did not involve political advantage for the Bush administration. Even though the stakes were lower and there was no political advantage to be gained, African states were still not consulted.
Inside the decision-making bureaucracy, the salience of bureaucratic actors can make a difference in the decisions that are made. Those with high salience will demand access to the decision-making process. A case in point is the Law of the Sea Treaty in the late 1970s. Inside the decision-making bureaucracy, the US Navy pressed for a 12-mile limit of sovereignty in opposition to proposed 200-mile zones. During this period, the US government supported the Law of the Sea Treaty. Once the Navy had secured US government agreement, then the Navy's salience lowered, and less powerful actors, such as deep sea mining companies, emerged to lobby against and effectively block US acceptance of the treaty. 11 This switch in salience levels occurred before the United States finally rejected the Law of the Sea in 1983. When the United
States did so, some governments were angered, having expected to be consulted about US intentions.
Within the AFRICOM decision-making bureaucracy, the salience of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and especially the OSD-Policy branch appeared to be significantly higher than that of other actors within DOD and the State Department. 12 It would appear that OSDPolicy timed its push for AFRICOM as Rumsfeld was deciding to leave office and wanted to finish incomplete projects and perhaps leave a legacy. 13 In the 1990s, the issue of NATO expansion was debated within the Clinton administration and was the subject of considerable bureaucratic infighting, led by National Security Adviser Anthony Lake and Assistant Secretary of State for East European Affairs, Strobe Talbott. Lake was able to use his proximity to President Clinton to help win the argument for NATO expansion. 14 Once the decision to expand was adopted, the Clinton administration was able to convince member states of NATO to agree and Russia to accede. Another factor to consider is the leadership style and psychology of the chief foreign and security policy actors and ability to set the agenda. 16 The Leadership style and agenda-setting models combined with the governmental (bureaucratic) politics model provide a plausible explanation of the decision-making process. 20 Rumsfeld was able to -frame and set the agenda‖, and Ryan Henry of OSD-Policy and Theresa Whelan of OSDAfrica worked hard with high salience within the bureaucracy, were supported by an authoritarian Rumsfeld, and were able to do so with minimal questioning and objections from other agencies and the president.
The governmental (bureaucratic) politics model posits that actors must overcome bureaucratic resistance through decisive political action. The problem is that decisive action often comes without multilateral consultation, which leads to the inability or difficulty to implement the decision internationally. In terms of salience and expected utility, a bureaucratic political victory appears to have been treasured more by OSD than a foreign policy success in winning over African leaders. When the stakes are low, it appears that actors tend to engage in governmental (bureaucratic) politics first and then explain their decisions to foreign actors later. It seems that there is a need to gain acceptance within the bureaucracy for a foreign policy innovation, such as AFRICOM, and to look for bureaucratic victories.
In the AFRICOM case, the most applicable hypotheses are: (1) The United States went through a similarly painful learning exercise in 1996 when it announced that it would lead in the creation of an African Crisis Response Force that would respond to Rwandan-style genocide and Somali-type civil war. African states rejected the paternalistic US proposal, and the Clinton administration had to go back to the drawing board. 22 Similarly, it seemed that AFRICOM represented the creation of a large new combatant command that would be inserted into one country in the African continent. The presence of more than a thousand US service personnel and the ability to call in thousands more would immediately pose a threat to the surrounding countries.
Some states, such as Liberia, Botswana, Mali, and Rwanda, were favorably disposed towards AFRICOM. 23 The variation in reaction across states, where some accept and others reject can be explained by the degree of commitment to the ideology of -non -alignment‖ with the -W est‖. The more committed a regime is to non-alignment; the less likely it is to support the expansion of a US presence on the continent. Non-alignment arose among those leaders who did not want to be part of the US-led anti-communist camp. 24 were never any substantial or existential threats to US national security interests in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, so it was never funded adequately by Congress, and SOUTHCOM continues to struggle today. 28 Given the preceding analysis of geographical combatant commands, it would appear that AFRICOM was created at the wrong time and was proposed to be located in the wrong place.
DOD assumed the legitimacy of combatant commands without doing the proper homework for AFRICOM, which demonstrates a lack of empathy.
DOD CREATES AFRICOM: DECISION-MAKING AND PRONOUNCEMENT
In the 1990s, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense broached the AFRICOM idea as DOD engagement in Africa and peacekeeping training and exercises increased. 29 The seam between EUCOM and CENTCOM in Africa grew problematic for DOD. 30 A low-level debate began over whether an Africa Command should be created as a fully fledged combatant command or as a -s ub-unified‖ command under EUCOM. 31 The Thus, many African leaders and media outlets believed that the US action in establishing AFRICOM had little to do with altruistic reasons and more to do with selfish motives of establishing access to oil and natural resources; enabling the United States to fight terrorism; and countering China's growing influence on the African continent. 44 Some saw the United States unilaterally establishing and announcing the formation of AFRICOM without prior consultation and input from African states as a sign of arrogance and condescension. 45 Others believed that AFRICOM represented another attempt by a bellicose United States to achieve military domination and that US intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan (and Somalia) could be repeated in Africa. Leaders and the media were concerned that AFRICOM's presence on the continent would increase conflict and terrorism on the continent.
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Another viewpoint was that AFRICOM was unneeded and that a multilateral approach with the regional economic communities, the African Union and the United Nations was the only viable approach to help Africans solve problems and that the unilateral approach by the United States, represented by AFRICOM, was unneeded and unwarranted. 47 The rejection of AFRICOM did not stem from widespread anti-Americanism but rather from the reluctance of leaders, the media and public opinion has stemmed from fears concerning US hegemony in Africa. 48 The Pew Global Attitudes Survey has indicated that the US image in Africa remains generally positive.
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In West Africa and ECOWAS
The response to AFRICOM was mixed with some negative and some positive reactions.
In Nigeria, the government and media were generally negative. An editorialist wrote, -It is gainsaying to mention that Africans will be seeing US marines and soldiers more often than not,‖ and referred to President Bush as -a n emerging Hitler whose primary motive is to extend his influence.‖ 50 A second commentator called into question the security assistance role of the new command -AF RICOM does not proffer answers to the growing tide of conflicts that inflict the beleaguered continent; rather it raises a lot of queries.‖ 51 A Nigerian commentator writing in a South African newspaper noted that the US failure to provide meaningful assistance to Liberia during its violent civil war belied any notion of a genuine altruistic intent. 52 He continued that AFRICOM was evidence of US neo-colonialist ambitions. 53 In 2007, Nigeria refused to host AFRICOM for a number of reasons including a fear that the United States would infringe upon Nigeria's sovereignty over oil. 54 In contrast, Liberian President Ellen Sirleaf-Johnson took a positive position toward AFRICOM and stated that its role would be -c onflict prevention, rather than intervention.‖ 55 The Liberian president was the only African leader to openly extend an invitation to establish AFRICOM headquarters on African soil. In response, the newly elected Nigerian President Umaru Yar'adua warned Liberia not to accept AFRICOM, and Nigeria as the regional hegemon influenced ECOWAS not to accept the new command.
In Southern Africa and SADC,
The response was mostly negative. 56 South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia were especially opposed due to their -na tional liberation‖ heritage and commitment to nonalignment. These SADC states believed that any US involvement in Africa should be from a distance and not on the continent. South Africa's opposition to AFRICOM derived from its position as the regional power in SADC and primary leader within the African Union. 57 In Central Africa
The attitude was mixed. Gabon explored the possibility of hosting an AFRICOM regional office. Gabon's patron, France, took an ambivalent position towards AFRICOM, ultimately opposing any physical presence in its sphere of influence. The most militarily powerful actor in the neighborhood, Angola, was opposed to an AFRICOM presence because of the regime's historical experience in opposition to the United States and its current ambivalent attitude towards the superpower.
In North Africa
Leaders and the media were negative mainly due to the prospect of AFRICOM posing a terrorist target for Al Qaeda. 69 This was especially true for pro-Western Morocco and Tunisia. In Morocco, the Justice and Development Party warned against making the country a -ba ttle ground‖ between US and its -enemies‖ if the government decided to host AFRICOM. Algerians noted the US unwillingness to offer anti-terror cooperation to Algeria when it was plagued by terrorist violence in the 1990s.
In non-aligned Libya, officials rejected idea of any foreign power establishing military bases anywhere in Africa after meeting with US officials. 72 Libya and to a lesser extent, Algeria, refused to host AFRICOM because of a desire to maintain sovereignty over its internal affairs and to keep the United States out of African affairs. 73 Widespread was concern was expressed in regard to sovereignty over oil and gas operations.
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RESPONSE TO REJECTION: US "STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS" CAMPAIGN
By May 2007, the United States and DOD responded to negative attitudes towards AFRICOM with a -strategic communications‖ campaign to win over African leaders and media.
US officials, especially in OSD-Policy, crafted a less-interest based message about AFRICOM, which emphasized the interagency and non-kinetic side of AFRICOM. In particular Ryan Henry found it necessary to meet with prospective hosts to eliminate misconceptions about AFRICOM. 75 The revised AFRICOM message was meant to assuage the fears of African leaders, as US officials began to travel the continent. US officials stressed that AFRICOM -partnerships‖ would assist organizations and states to meet security challenges and provide training and coordination in counterterrorism, peacekeeping, and disaster relief. However, as a result of the campaign, the 91 An indication in the field research of South Africa's negative attitude was a SANDF brigadier general's question at a symposium regarding whether or not the United States was still trying to -smuggle‖ AFRICOM onto the continent. 92 This question came after it had been made clear in the symposium (and three months after US officials had announced) that AFRICOM would no longer seek to place a headquarters or regional offices on the continent. 93 The question followed a query by the same brigadier general on Nigeria's hosting of Africa Endeavor, an indication that AFRICOM was gaining increasing acceptance in African countries and that the South African government had come to the realization that opposition to AFRICOM on the continent was fading. In response to a comment that South Africa's negative reaction to AFRICOM was being driven by the -i deology of non-alignment‖, 97 the Department of Foreign Affairs official defended South African adherence to non-alignment and South-South relations. South Africa still wants to be able to determine its own foreign policy objectives, including non-alignment. Unfortunately, the United States sees non-alignment as a threat and overreacts, with a -you are against us‖ syndrome. Instead of reacting so negatively to South Africa's foreign policy, the United States needed to respect the non-aligned perspective in the development of AFRICOM.
OPPOSITION TO AFRICOM FROM THINK TANK EXPERTS AND ACADEMICS
South Africa has by far the greatest concentration of think tank experts on the African continent; it also has a large number of university researchers who focus on African security issues. 98 Think tanks and their experts are important in that they advise the South African government and other governments as well as SADC and the African Union on policy matters.
Some also advise the donor community (e.g., the European Union and European governments) and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Therefore, they are an important voice in South African and international civil society. A majority of think tank experts and university researchers interviewed opposed AFRICOM and offered rational arguments for why it was a bad idea. 99 One argument expressed was that AFRICOM represented an escalation of the war on terror in Africa, which was not in Africa's interests. and defense in order to dry up support for extremists and terrorists has been adopted by the US government and particularly by the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in cooperation with USAID and the US Embassy in Nairobi. 101 The criticism from think tank experts and others is that the military dominates because of the preponderance of resources and the large -D‖ of the military swamping the much smaller -Ds‖ of diplomacy and development.
The critics believe that AFRICOM will dominate the diplomatic and development instruments of power in Africa. 102 Several experts recommended that the United States should move away from the militarization of foreign policy and engagement. 103 
AFRICOM is also burdened by its moniker -a -c ombatant command‖. The question from think tank experts and university researchers is -what is AFRICOM going to -c ombat‖?
In dealing with this sort of question, the United States should make it clear that AFRICOM is merely to be used to enhance peacekeeping capabilities and skills in the context of technical cooperation and building capacity.
The United States and Africa need to engage in dialogue to establish common interests before AFRICOM will be well-received. The United Nations also needs to be supportive of AFRICOM for it to succeed. 104 The United States needs to rethink its modes of engagement. The
African Union and sub-regional organizations would have been more responsive if the United
States would properly engage. 105 The United States and AFRICOM need to work properly with regional security organizations, such as SADC and ECOWAS, if AFRICOM is to be successful.
It is also important to engage with civil society throughout Africa. Unfortunately, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, had only one video teleconference with civil society while AFRICOM was being sold to South Africa.
In regard to individual think-tank experts, Adekeye Adebajo, a Nigerian and Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, criticized the United States and AFRICOM on a number of fronts. 106 He believed that AFRICOM will become a reality, but there is a deeper issue at stake.
There are suspicions about the US war on terror, with 2,000 US troops in Djibouti; 107 William -K ip‖ Ward replaced Wald and was more diplomatic but has much fence-mending to do.
SUPPORT FOR AFRICOM
Support for AFRICOM in South Africa came from think tank experts and university researchers that are generally pro-West, such as Greg Mills of the Brenthurst Foundation (supported by the Anglo-American Corporation). 108 The argument of Mills and others is that South African leaders think ideologically and not strategically, which disadvantages the country in the pursuit of its interests, especially economic interests throughout Africa. A new generation of South African leaders needs to be taught to think strategically. They need to move beyond ideology and find realistic ways in which South Africa can advance in the world and Africa be made more secure. 109 Mills commented that AFRICOM was clearly an example of bad US public relations.
However, South Africa will have to eventually swallow its pride and accept AFRICOM for a number of reasons, especially the deterioration of the South African National Defense Force and other security problems. However, the actual implementation at the operational level is poor.
African states need partnerships with entities such as AFRICOM to work to bring about peace and stability and to build capacity through training and other measures.
Therefore, to reject AFRICOM with a broad brush is not wise due to the fact that most Mbeki never demonstrated that he possessed a clear understanding of South Africa's national interest or how to balance ideological considerations and the country's priorities in trade, investment and international politics.
VIEWS FROM NEUTRAL INTERVIEWEES
At the United Nations, for example, short-term tactical politicization routinely overshadowed strategic considerations. Instead of leading the African voting bloc, the UN's biggest, on trade access and help to the continent, South Africa blocked UN managerial reform, obstructed the interests of Western powers and maneuvered around tougher action on Burma, Zimbabwe and Iran. None of this did one bit for Africa or Africans.
The anti-imperialistic tenor of Mbeki's foreign policy was understandable, given his background. Less explicable was his failure to apply to Russia and China the same opprobrium he reserved for the West, especially the United States. Whatever the issue, under Mbeki South African opposition to U.S. policies often appeared more reflexive than considered. 121 Mills also said that no one in the South African government or other governments has focused on critiquing the destruction of the Zimbabwe economy through terrible policy choices. The critiques have only been in the political realm, regarding Robert Mugabe's abuses of power.
Vrey and Esterhuyse said that the real threat to South African interests is increasing
Chinese involvement in construction and mining industries throughout Africa. However, South Many South Africans think that the United States has a base deep in the heart of Africa and a strike force poised for action anywhere on the continent; that the United States invaded Iraq for oil; and that the United States has a naval base in Equatorial Guinea to protect its oil interests.
With all these known facts, the United States did not have a logistics issue but a public relations issue. There was no sounding of public opinion, with officials assuming that AFRICOM was a bureaucratic exercise of rearranging the map; instead, AFRICOM was a public relations nightmare. The -3D‖ approach to peacebuilding is seen as even more surreptitious, fed by the -t ransformational diplomacy‖ initiative by the Department of State, which supposedly -m ilitarizes‖ development policy and programs.
Spector recommends crafting a public relations strategy for AFRICOM and US-South In regard to the prospects for change in South African foreign policy now that Thabo
Mbeki is no longer president, there were a variety of views. 125 The end result is that Thabo Mbeki will no longer be leading foreign policy. 126 He has been replaced by a less outward-looking leader and government, which is likely to be more pragmatic. While prospects for improved US-South
African relations do not look good, there are those who believe that a Zuma administration will lead to improved relations and perhaps even to the acceptance of AFRICOM. Brooks Spector predicts that a Zuma administration will be pragmatic like the Mandela one and that the ideologues of the Mbeki government will be replaced. There are those who believe that the foreign policies of both countries will be more pragmatic and amenable to improved relations and that it will end the -liberation movement club‖ (Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique,
South Africa). Greg Mills commented that -if the new administration in Pretoria can unshackle
itself from the ANC's inhibitive liberation ethos, Mbeki's departure from office could revitalize South Africa's standing in world affairs.‖ 127 Another factor to consider is the decline of educated elites at the pinnacle of power will mean that South Africa could be less capable in managing foreign affairs. South Africa will become less assertive in its foreign policy. Other experts believe that the counterterrorism focus of AFRICOM will make it difficult to work with SADC and other actors. It was better when the US focus was on ACRI and ACOTA peacekeeping training and not so much on counterterrorism training. 129 Education and training for security among policymakers and practitioners in SADC region. CDSM preparing a ten year impact study. Funding for security education might come from USAID.
The United States could help in the building of security strategies in South Africa and SADC. South Africa lacks a security strategy, and there is a need to develop strategic thinking.
The SADC Organ on Defense, Politics and Security is plagued by the lack of transparency and a clear strategy is needed. Furthermore, it is difficult to know how decisions are made within SADC.
In regard to the issue of whether the United States and AFRICOM should engage primarily with states or with regional organizations, viewpoints varied. Greg Mills said that the US government needs to differentiate its policies, because each state has its own needs and 
WHY THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENSE FORCE (SANDF) NEEDS AFRICOM
The deterioration of the South African Air Force, Navy, and Army has reached crisis proportions. Helmoed Roemer Heitman of Jane's Defense Weekly commented on the deterioration of the air force and the navy, with the loss of maintenance personnel and pilots. The
Gripen fighter aircraft that have been arriving cannot be flown. 130 Francois Hugo of the Center for Maritime Technology commented that the navy is sending a corvette to China and has to draw crew from the other corvettes and that three submarines bought from Germany cannot put to sea. 131 Thus, the South African Navy and South African Air Force both need AFRICOM assistance. were a joke and that there was a lack of concern about the outside world.
South Africa has the hardware but not the will or capacity to do peacekeeping in Africa.
There has been an absence of political will when putting troops in the field to give them the proper equipment and rules of engagement. pronounced its intention to establish a base in Botswana and now has decided not to place AFRICOM on the continent. As a sovereign state, once Botswana has analyzed a proposal and if it serves the people and national interests. Botswana will make whatever decision suits its interests, regardless of its neighbor's perceptions. In terms of engaging with Southern Africa, SADC is not united at the regional level. Sanoto commented that it is best for AFRICOM to engage with individual states. In addition, AFRICOM should assist in developing regional brigades. He concluded that Botswana's approach is for the country to project itself internationally in the same way as Botswana wants to be treated.
Colonel Lawrence Rapula of the Botswana Defense Force and Senior Operations Officer at SADC said that the AFRICOM concept was good, but the United States made the mistake of trying to put the headquarters on the continent. 136 It should have been placed where others will not suffer. The countries that oppose AFRICOM are those that are run by former liberation movements (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia). The problem with those countries is that they blame others, like the United States and Britain, for their failings.
There is a Setswana saying --don 't hide yourself behind your finger.‖ Don't blame others for your own failures. The former liberation militants feel that they are owed. In contrast, Botswana is a country that was not freed by a liberation movement and the leadership took responsibility for For some, the ideology of non-alignment is a way to compensate for vulnerability. In regard to the media and public opinion, they have been important in the AFRICOM case, though they remain of secondary importance to the positions of leaders. Also, the feedback to AFRICOM by leading states, such as Nigeria and South Africa, compared to that of sub-regional organizations indicates that the political strength of the latter is incipient and that will remain subordinate to leading states. For example, AFRICOM could assist Nigeria to improve the security situation in the oil-rich
Niger Delta and establishing a more permanent naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea. However, AFRICOM's activities ultimately will be less significant than EUCOM and CENTCOM's and will disappoint African leaders.
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